

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 18, 1967

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

LIMDIS

The Honorable  
John W. Tuthill  
American Ambassador  
Rio de Janeiro

Dear Jack:

Since Sam Lewis returned from Rio, I have been pondering what to advise you about your desire to reduce the over-all American presence in Brazil. Sam described your idea of sending a cable asking for a Washington task force to help you attack the problem, and we have also been thinking about other possible ways you might proceed.

I understand your concern to be primarily about the excessive involvement of U.S. officials exerting influence at many different points in Brazilian society, and about what you feel to be U.S. intervention into too many aspects of the Brazilian Government's business, not primarily a concern with the "physical presence" question of a great many people and cars (which, in my view, would probably only apply in Recife anyway), nor any great worry about the monetary level of our over-all aid.

If this interpretation is correct, then I share your feeling in large degree. All the indicators point to the next several years, at least, being ones in which we must conduct our business differently than we became accustomed to doing under Castello Branco if we are truly to serve the best interests of the United States. We

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassified Authority: 44281 By: Laurie  
Madsen Date: 04-14-2015



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

FOIA(b) (1)

will have to avoid the political reefs without, of course, giving the impression that we are abandoning Brazil. In my opinion, some reduction of the visibility and political vulnerability of our USAID operations and, perhaps, our MILGROUP as well, should be high on the agenda, and there are undoubtedly important reasons to refashion some of the other organizational units under your control, [ ] as well.

As I see it, what you need are four things: persistence, high-level Washington backing, technical advice, and the commitment of your own key staff. Without all four your effort could lag badly and stir up more problems than it solves. With all four, I believe the chances are good that you can achieve a good deal of what you seek, and in an acceptable period of time. You will probably also have a more effective organization in the bargain.

As to tactics: My suggestion would be that you send a thoughtful cable (LIMDIS) on this matter, directed personally to Rusk, McNamara, Gaud, Marks, and Helms, laying out the political and policy rationale for your conclusions, and stating your intention to move in a specified direction within a definite time frame unless Washington Departments and Agencies can offer persuasive reasons not to do so. Be liberal in the time you give them to reply; don't assert a too tough, take-it-or-leave-it proposal. Rather, pitch it on a more cooperative note: We've got a new ball game in Brazil which requires new tactics, and this is what I propose to do.

I think such a proposal is timely. As you know, there is a lot of rethinking going on now as to just what our role is in the world--and what it is not, what we have the power, skill and resources to do--and what we don't. The simplistic, so-called "truisms" of several years ago--particularly as regards economic, social and political development, not to mention military security--are giving ground in the face of some setbacks we have experienced.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

There seems to me to be a growing view here--which I share--that there is a kind of political and socio-cultural turmoil existing in a number of countries in the world which has seduced us to heavy intervention in their affairs, but which is essentially beyond our power to control. Nonetheless, as William PFAFF said in a recent review of Steel's PAX AMERICANA, our own sense of mission too often continues unchanged, obscuring our sense of national interest and impelling us to still additional involvements.

But back to the tactics: Rather than ask for the dispatch of any high-level inter-agency task force, a device which I frankly believe would in this case cause many more problems than it would solve, I think you should state your intention to ask your Country Team members to prepare action programs under your direction to carry out this policy once you are confident of Washington support. Should one or more technical experts be needed from Washington on TDY to help various of the Country Team members, we could then help to field them for you--although not necessarily all at the same time or as a single group.

In this way, you would be assured of the support you will need here before you start, but you would have the advantage of using your own authority as Ambassador to carry out the policy you have recommended. Moreover, I personally believe you are much more likely to achieve useful results by putting the responsibility on your key staff members who are in the best position, really, to know what should be eliminated and who would thus assume the burden of justifying the details of the program to their own headquarters agencies, rather than by using a task force outside the chain of command. As a beginning you might want to establish a fairly senior Working Group to recommend to you a set of criteria to be used in evaluating all USG activities in Brazil.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4-

In the USAID, for example, I think there are a number of persons who share already your disposition to reshape substantially our far-flung program. The over-all evaluation report recently drafted for Bill Gaud by Jim Killen's group provides a powerful tool for obtaining Gaud's support, since it argues for something like this approach. I understand that Stu Van Dyke was well pleased with Killen's compliments about USAID staff and operations. He would probably not oppose being formally instructed to come up with a plan to implement Killen's recommendations within the framework of a tight timetable related to your over-all policy concerns. As for the MILGROUP, you may encounter resistance at a number of levels; nonetheless, General Linville is newly arrived and should not be defensive as yet about the organization he inherited. The same would probably hold true for John Mowinckel and the USIS.

FOIA(b)(1)

Sam and I have also discussed the problem of relating this effort to the program cycle for each of the operating agencies, which in its inexorable way demands program submissions for Washington review at various times during the year. Obviously, your "re-shaping program" must be carried out as a separate exercise--on something approximating a crash basis--if it is not to be chewed up in the bureaucratic machinery. If, however, you will insist on inserting your own policy objectives prominently in all program documents coming to Washington over coming months, and will insist that personnel planning and budget figures trend downward rather than upward, we will then be able to give you better support from here at key points in the cycle. An immediate case in point is AID's Program Memorandum due in Washington September 1, which will provide the framework for budget and personnel planning here for the next 18-24 months.

I hope the foregoing is of help to you. It represents only Sam's views and my own. If you want me to do something further now, or consider a different tack, please let me know.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-5-

As I conclude this, I can't help thinking of Shelley's OZYMANDIAS. As I recall, on the pedestal of the statue of King Ozymandias were the words, "Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair!" -- followed in the poem by "Round the decay of that colossal wreck the lone and level sands stretched far away!" I'm not sure what the application is (it's awfully late Monday evening, and I'm tired), but I think there's a lesson there someplace.

Até logo.

Sincerely,

Jack B. Kubisch  
Brazil Country Director

ARA/LA-BR:SWLewis/JBKubisch/lm:7/18/67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~